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AGAINST DIVINE TRUTHMAKER SIMPLICITY
Noël B. Saenz
Divine Simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no 
metaphysical complexity; he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic 
properties. Recently, Jeffrey Brower has put forward an account of divine 
simplicity that has it that God is the truthmaker for all intrinsic essential 
predications about him. This allows Brower to preserve the intuitive thought 
that God is not a property but a concrete being. In this paper, I provide two 
objections to Brower’s account that are meant to show that whatever merits 
this account of divine simplicity has, plausibility is not one of them.
Divine simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no 
metaphysical complexity; he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic 
properties. Now modern discussions of divine simplicity have tended to 
focus exclusively on a version of divine simplicity that makes God iden-
tical to a property.1 But, as has been stressed before, saying that God is 
a property is highly implausible.2 Jeffrey Brower, a proponent of divine 
simplicity, agrees when he says
the strategy they adopt [the strategy of making God identical to a property] 
for making sense of simplicity appears not only extreme, but also extremely 
ad hoc. Indeed, it would seem that any account of simplicity that could ren-
der the doctrine coherent without giving up the traditional conception of 
properties would be preferable to them.3
1William Mann, “Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 18 (1982), 451–471; William Mann, 
“Simplicity and Properties: A Reply to Morris,” Religious Studies 22 (1986), 343–353; Brian 
Leftow, “Is God an Abstract Object?,” Noûs 24 (1990), 581–598; William F. Vallicella, “Divine 
Simplicity: A New Defense,” Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992), 508–525; William F. Vallicella, “On 
Property Self-Exemplification: Rejoinder to Miller,” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), 478–481; 
Katherin Rogers, “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 32 (1996), 
165–186.
2For the locus classicus of this objection, see Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Mar-
quette University Press, 1980), 47. A similar objection has also been raised by Richard Gale, 
On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23–34.
3Jeffrey Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 25 (2008), 11.
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I concur. There is just not much going for this view.4 So let’s take a look at 
another, fairly recent, account of divine simplicity. And here we turn to 
Brower.5
According to Brower, there is no need to identify God with a property 
in order to make sense of divine simplicity. Identifying him as the truth-
maker for intrinsic essential predications about him will do.6 In order to see 
what leads him to say this, we need to get clear on what Brower takes the 
doctrine of divine simplicity to be. He says
the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity can be expressed in terms of the 
requirements it places on divine predications. At least as understood by the 
medievals, what this doctrine tells us is that if a predication such as “God 
is good” is true, then there exists an entity, God’s goodness, that is identical 
with God; likewise, if “God is powerful” is true, then God’s power exists and 
is identical with God; and so on for other such true divine predications.7
Summing this up, Brower says that the traditional doctrine of divine sim-
plicity is expressed by, and requires nothing more than, the following:
Simplicity: If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then 
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
Brower then argues that Simplicity is ontologically neutral with respect to 
what God’s F-ness is. He says
So understood, the doctrine of divine simplicity takes no stand whatsoever 
on the precise nature of the entities with which it identifies God. It does 
4For a way of understanding divine simplicity that perhaps avoids this objection, see 
Eleonore Stump, “God’s Simplicity,” in The Oxford Handbook to Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and 
Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Stump, in describing Aquinas’ view 
of simplicity, says that “sometimes we have to characterize God with abstract terms—and so 
we say that God is love—and sometimes we have to characterize him with concrete terms—
and so we say that God is loving” (142). So, according to Stump’s Aquinas, it is acceptable to 
say that God is abstract (like a property), so long as this does not rule out God being concrete. 
So there is something false about conceiving of God as abstract alone or as concrete alone 
(consider, using Stump’s example, that there is something false about conceiving of light as 
a wave alone or a particle alone). Given this view of divine simplicity (what Stump calls “a 
quantum metaphysics”), the objection considered in the main text has little bite (though this 
is only because we are now, at least in large part, mysterians with respect to the kind of thing 
God is). As an anonymous referee rightly points out, this shows us that “getting clear on 
what the doctrine is makes a difference to its evaluation.”
5I have been told that the view to be presented is actually quite faithful to the view that 
Aquinas and other medievals had of divine simplicity. If this is true, then this view is far 
from being a recent account of divine simplicity (even if it is, as Jeffrey Brower made clear in 
personal correspondence, a contemporary statement of it).
6Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity”; Jeffrey Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). For others who have it that God is the truthmaker for his 
intrinsic essential predications, see Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey Brower, “A Theistic Argu-
ment against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity),” in Oxford 
Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 2, ed. Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
Alexander R. Pruss, “On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy 
of Religion, Vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Kwanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
7Brower, “Making Sense,” 5–6.
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assume that there are (or at least could be) entities corresponding to ex-
pressions such as “God’s goodness,” “God’s power,” and “God’s wisdom.” 
Nonetheless, it says nothing about the specific ontological category to which 
they belong.8
From this, Brower concludes that in order to avoid identifying God with 
a property, all we have to do is accept the intuitively plausible truthmaker 
account of predication:
Truthmaker: If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then 
a’s F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker 
for [< a is F >].9
That Truthmaker avoids identifying God with a property should be ob-
vious. For instead of identifying a’s F-ness with a property, Truthmaker 
identifies it with that which makes true < a is F > and there is no reason to 
think that the truthmaker, at least in this case, is a property. As Brower says, 
“to characterize an entity as a truthmaker is to characterize it in terms of 
a certain metaphysical function or role,” viz., that of making some propo-
sition true.10 This, according to Brower, “leaves open the possibility that 
truthmakers can belong to ontological categories of very different kinds, 
including both concrete individuals (such as persons) and properties.”11
Furthermore, with respect to intrinsic essential predications such as 
< Plato is a human > and contingent predications such as < Plato is wise >, 
Brower thinks that all that is required as a truthmaker for the former, but 
not the latter, is Plato.12 That it is plausible that only Plato is required to 
make true < Plato is a human > is due to its being the case that part of what 
it is to be Plato is to be human; being human is essential to Plato. However, 
this line of reasoning does not hold for < Plato is wise > since being wise 
is not part of what it is to be Plato. Now since the reason for thinking that 
Plato is a truthmaker for his essential predications generalizes, we can 
say that concrete individuals are, in general, truthmakers for their true 
intrinsic essential predications.
So Simplicity, when coupled with Truthmaker, and given what was 
just said concerning intrinsic essential predications, entails that God is 
identical with the truthmakers for his intrinsic essential predications. This 
result is not absurd. As Brower says
8Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 109.
9I will use “< p >” to stand for “the proposition that p.”
10Brower, “Making Sense,” 18.
11Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 111.
12Brower does not elaborate on what he means by “essential.” But I take it that in order 
for a predication to be an essential predication, it must be a predication that is, in some 
sense, central to what the thing is (see Kit Fine, “Essence and Modality,” Philosophical Perspec-
tives 8 [1994], 1–16; Michael Gorman, “The Essential and the Accidental,” Ratio 18 [2005], 
276–289). So it is not enough that some predication of x is necessarily true of x in order for 
that predication to be an essential predication of x. If we want an essential predication of x, 
that predication needs to be, at least in part, central to, or about the identity of, x.
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the truthmaker interpretation goes considerable distance toward rendering 
the doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. On this interpretation, for ex-
ample, the doctrine does not require that God is identical with each of his 
properties, and hence is himself a property. In fact, it does not even require 
that God has any properties at all (in the ontologically loaded sense of ex-
emplifiables). On the contrary, all the doctrine requires is that, for every true 
intrinsic divine predication, there is a truthmaker and God is identical with 
that truthmaker. But there is nothing obviously absurd about that.13
So appealing to Truthmaker both avoids the absurd result that God is 
identical with a property and allows God to be a concrete individual. This 
is good.
But is it good enough? No. For even though I am willing to agree with 
Brower that his brand of simplicity, which I will henceforth call Divine 
Truthmaker Simplicity (“DTS” for short), is more believable than the brand 
that identifies God with a property, I think there are good reasons to think 
it implausible. So in each of § 1 and § 2, I will provide an argument for 
thinking that DTS is implausible.14 In § 3, I will show why these arguments 
are useless against a view according to which God is complex.
1. The Truthmaker Argument
That God is the truthmaker for his intrinsic essential predications would 
seem to rely on the following principle:
Essential: For any concrete x, if < p > is an intrinsic essential predication 
of x, then x makes < p > true.
But why accept Essential? It does not strike me as obvious, and Brower’s 
only defense of it requires appealing to its seeming plausibility. Brower 
says
it does seem plausible to think that a concrete individual can be the truth-
maker for a proper subset of its true essential predications—namely, each of 
its true intrinsic essential predications.15
Turning to God, Brower says
This interpretation of simplicity seems promising if we focus on predica-
tions such as “God is divine,” “God is good,” and “God is powerful.” For 
in each of these cases, God can plausibly be regarded as their truthmaker.16
So for Brower, Essential appears plausible and this, it would seem, is why 
he accepts it. But I do not have this plausibility intuition. And even if I did, 
I would reject it. Here is why. Truthmakers are supposed to be that which 
13Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 112.
14For an argument against DTS that differs from mine, see William F. Vallicella, “Divine 
Simplicity,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2014 Edi-
tion), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/divine-simplicity/ .
15Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 111.
16Brower, “Making Sense,” 19.
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gives a metaphysical ground of truth, and grounds are supposed to be ex-
planatory in nature.17 That is, if x makes < p > true, then x (or x’s existence) 
metaphysically explains why < p > is true.18 As Brower himself says
when a predication of the form “a is F” is true, there must be something that 
makes it true—or better, some thing (or plurality of things) which explains its 
truth or in virtue of which it is true. As these qualifications indicate, the no-
tion of “making” at work here is not causal, but explanatory.19
So if x fails to metaphysically explain (or as I will sometimes just say, explain) 
that < p > is true, then x fails to make < p > true. This tells against Essential. 
To use Brower’s example, take an intrinsic essential predication of Plato, 
< Plato is a human > and ask “what makes this proposition true?” Notice 
that the answer cannot be Plato. Why? Because saying that this proposition 
is true in virtue of Plato or that Plato makes it true, and therefore explains 
why it is true that he is human, is explanatorily empty. Listing Plato as that 
which makes true < Plato is a human > is of no help in telling me what it is 
that metaphysically explains that it is true that he is a human. Notice that 
I am not simply claiming that I cannot see how Plato explains the truth of 
< Plato is a human > (which, if true, could be a mere epistemic shortcoming 
on my part). Rather, I am claiming that I can see that he doesn’t explain it. 
Plato, the concrete being, is just not rich enough to provide, on his own, 
a metaphysical ground of the truth of < Plato is a human >.20 However, if 
the answer to the above question is that the proposition is true because 
Plato instantiates being a human, or that the state of affairs of Plato’s being a 
human explains that it is true that Plato is a human, then I have been told 
something that is explanatorily helpful.21 I have been told not merely that 
17For others who accept this claim, see, inter alia, Gideon Rosen, “Metaphysical Depen-
dence: Grounding and Reduction,” in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, ed. Bob 
Hale and Aviv Hoffman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Jonathan Schaffer, “The 
Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker,” Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010), 
307–324; Paul Audi, 2012. “A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding,” in 
Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, ed. Fabrice Correia and Ben-
jamin Schnieder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michael Clark and David 
Liggins, “Recent Work on Grounding,” Analysis (2012), 1–12; Kit Fine, “A Guide to Ground,” 
in Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, ed. Fabrice Correia and 
Benjamin Schnieder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Ross Cameron, “Truth-
makers,” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, ed. Michael Glanzberg (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming).
18The use of “metaphysical” here is to contrast the kind of explanation under discussion 
with causal explanations. That Jill threw the ball provides a causal, and not a metaphysical, 
explanation for the breaking of the window. That Plato is wise provides a metaphysical, and 
not a causal, explanation for the truth of < Plato is wise >.
19Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 110.
20It is important to note here that there needs to be more to a metaphysical explanation 
than necessitation. Plato necessitates that < 2 + 1 = 3 > is true. But of course, he does not ex-
plain it. So the mere fact that Plato necessitates (as he surely does) that < Plato is a human > 
is true does very little, if anything, with respect to establishing him as an explanation for the 
truth of < Plato is a human >.
21Of course, it is no part of truthmaker theory that for every predicate, there is a cor-
responding property. So perhaps there is no property being a human. No problem, for even 
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Plato exists, but something about how Plato intrinsically is. And how Plato 
intrinsically is, as opposed to whether Plato is, metaphysically explains 
(and so grounds) that a proposition about how Plato intrinsically is has the 
property of being true.
All this should be rather unsurprising. Intrinsic predications involve 
descriptions of the world. They involve saying that the world (or one of 
its inhabitants) is some way. But then it should come as no surprise that 
whatever makes such predications true must involve how the world in 
fact is (or how one of its inhabitants in fact is). There needs to be a kind 
match between what is true and its truthmaker. If it is true that something 
is some way, then what makes it true must be structured in the right kind 
of way if it is to explain why the predication applies to it. Plato is just not 
structured in the way he needs to be if he is to explain why “is a human” 
applies to him.22 But then Plato cannot explain why < Plato is a human > 
is true.
I have been given the following response: For the advocate of DTS, 
pointing to Plato as that which makes true < Plato is a human > is a way of 
pointing to the essence of Plato, and that essence of Plato comes pre-built 
with what you are calling “how things (intrinsically and essentially) are.” 
The essence of Plato is pre-built as being a human. Pointing to Plato, then, 
is a way of pointing to the truthmaker.
But it is not at all clear how this helps matters, and for three reasons. 
First, even if pointing to Plato is a way of pointing to the truthmaker, it 
does not follow that Plato is the truthmaker (consider, pointing to a picture 
of Plato can be a way of pointing to him, but it does not follow from this 
that the picture is Plato). Second, how should we understand “pre-built”? 
On its most natural reading, the thought here is that if essences come pre-
built with how things intrinsically and essentially are, then the essence is 
given to us as being composed by how the thing it is an essence of intrinsi-
cally and essentially is. But with respect to God, this cannot be the case 
if divine simplicity is true. God is his essence, and since God exhibits no 
metaphysical complexity, then neither does his essence. But his essence 
would if it were composed by how God intrinsically and essentially is. 
So until a meaning is given to “pre-built” that does not entail that God 
is complex, the present response is, at best, inconclusive. Third, even if 
how things intrinsically and essentially are is pre-built into the essences of 
if you think that this property does not exist, the point still holds. What we need here is 
something about how Plato is (a state of affairs or trope), and not merely that Plato is.
22Notice that this is not to deny that Plato is structured. For suppose we accept a constit-
uent ontology according to which concrete objects like Plato have properties as constituents. 
This is perfectly consistent with saying that Plato alone is not structured in the right kind of 
way to make < Plato is a human > true. Of course, if we accept a constituent ontology, there 
is a sense in which Plato has “within himself” that which makes true < Plato is a human >, 
namely, the state of affairs Plato’s being human or the trope Plato’s human-ness. But this is not 
tantamount to saying that Plato himself is what which explains that < Plato is a human > is 
true. If anything, it is to concede that Plato is not the truthmaker but that a state of affairs or 
trope (things fundamentally different from Plato) “within” Plato are.
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those very things, it does not follow that the things that have the essences 
are good explanations for truths about their essences. That is, even if one 
could point to the essence of a thing simply by pointing to the thing that 
has the essence, it does not follow that the thing is a good explanation for 
the truth of an intrinsic essential predication about the thing. Explanation 
is hyper-intensional. If x explains y, and x is intimately associated with z 
such that x necessitates z  and vice-versa (as the instantiated essence of a 
thing necessitates the thing and vice-versa), it does not follow that z also 
explains y. It would follow if this intimate association were identity (which 
is precisely what divine simplicity theorists will say since according to 
divine simplicity, God is his essence). But this is, in large part, what my 
argument is questioning. Plato does not explain certain truths about how 
he intrinsically and essentially is. That Plato is some intrinsic, essential, 
way does. So Plato is not identical to how he intrinsically and essentially 
is. Therefore, on pain of begging the question, the present response has 
little to no force against the present objection.
Here is a related response.23 Suppose we take the old-fashioned defini-
tion of a human as a rational animal. If, then, you beheld Plato himself—not 
just his bare existence, of course—you would or could “see” that he’s ra-
tional, and that he’s an animal, and that such are essential to him. So Plato 
does provide enough—if only one can understand him well enough—to 
explain the truth that Plato is a human. This is so even if it would be ex-
planatorily empty for us to merely point at Plato in order to explain the 
truth that Plato is a human. Nonetheless, it would seem that the grounds 
of explanation are there, in Plato.
But notice that, according to this response, to behold Plato himself re-
quires to behold not just Plato, but how Plato essentially is. It is to behold 
that Plato is rational, and an animal, and that these are essential to him. 
So of course Plato, when beheld in this way, provides enough to explain the 
truth that Plato is a human since to behold Plato in this way is just to con-
sider how Plato essentially is. So what is doing the explanatory work here 
is not really Plato, but how Plato essentially is. This is precisely what I am 
arguing for. In agreement with this response, Plato does provide enough 
(by being essentially human) even if Plato is not enough. In agreement 
with this response, the ground of the truth that Plato is a human is there, 
in Plato (because Plato is essentially human), even if this ground is not 
Plato himself. So really, this response is in complete agreement with me in 
suggesting that what Plato provides, or what is in Plato (namely, his being 
essentially some way), as opposed to Plato himself, does explain that it is 
true that he is a human.
So, I claim, it is not Plato, but rather how Plato is, that explains why a 
proposition about how Plato is has the property of being true. A proposi-
tion about how Plato is has the property of being true in virtue of how 
Plato is and not in virtue of Plato. So Essential, which is required for DTS, 
23I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this response.
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is false. DTS is therefore in trouble. Now Essential (perhaps) has some 
recent historical support in the work of David Armstrong, a champion 
of truthmaking.24 Therefore, one cannot be accused of engaging in com-
pletely aberrant theorizing about truthmaking if they accept Essential. But 
of course, the point still holds. Insofar as truthmakers are supposed to 
metaphysically explain why truths are true (as Brower himself accepts), 
merely appealing to a thing in order to explain why intrinsic essential 
claims about that thing are true is to provide a truthmaker that is too 
course-grained. We (including Armstrong) need to dig deeper, and pro-
vide more structure in our ontology, if we want satisfactory truthmakers 
here.
Notice that this argument against Essential does not call
Truthmaker: If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then 
a’s F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker 
for [< a is F >].
into question. It is consistent with everything said above that a’s F-ness 
makes true < a is F > so long as (at least in many cases) a’s F-ness is not 
identical to a.25 For example, it is consistent with everything said above 
that Plato’s human-ness makes true < Plato is a human > so long as Plato’s 
human-ness is not identical to Plato. This shows us that there exists a ten-
sion between Truthmaker and
24David M. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 98. It is worth noting here that even before Armstrong came on the truthmaking scene, 
Mulligan, Simons, and Smith already had it that things are not truthmakers for intrinsic 
essential truths about them (see Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, “Truth-
Makers,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44 (1984), 300). So there is even earlier 
recent historical support for rejecting Essential.
25An anonymous referee suggested the following case as a counter-example to the claim 
just made in the main text:
It is true that goodness is good.
The goodness of goodness makes < Goodness is good > true.
The goodness of goodness is identical to goodness.
But I think this case fails. Here is why: The third claim, that the goodness of goodness is 
identical to goodness, is plausible because we are taking “the goodness of goodness” to refer 
simply to the property that goodness, in this case, instantiates, namely goodness. Obviously, 
if “the goodness of goodness” refers simply to the property goodness, then the goodness of 
goodness is identical to goodness. But if so, then it is no longer obvious that the goodness 
of goodness makes < Goodness is good > true. This is so because it is by no means obvious 
that the property goodness makes it true that goodness is good. Indeed, the very same argu-
ment for thinking that Plato does not make it true that Plato is a human because Plato fails 
to explain why < Plato is a human > is true works in this case. What explains the truth of 
< Goodness is good > is something about how goodness is. We need goodness to be some way, 
namely good, in order for it to be the case that < Goodness is good > is true. Appealing simply 
to goodness in order to explain that it is true that goodness is some way is explanatorily 
unsatisfactory. So if “the goodness of goodness” refers simply to the property goodness, then 
the second claim in the above case is suspect. However, if “the goodness of goodness” does 
not refer simply to the property goodness, then the third claim in the above case is suspect. 
So “the goodness of goodness” refers either to the property goodness or it does not. If it does, 
then the second claim is false. If it does not, then the third claim is false. Either way, the above 
case involves a false claim.
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Simplicity: If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then 
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
According to Truthmaker, God’s omnibenevolence makes < God is 
omnibenevolent > true. But according to Simplicity, God’s omnibenevo-
lence = God. However, God does not make < God is omnibenevolent > true 
for the very same reason that Plato does not make < Plato is a human > 
true. Merely pointing to God as an answer to “what makes < God is om-
nibenevolent > true?” is explanatorily empty. As with Plato, what we need 
here is something about how God is and not merely whether God is. So 
God does not explain why < God is omnibenevolent > is true. But then, 
given Simplicity, neither does God’s omnibenevolence, which contradicts 
Truthmaker.26 Therefore, either Truthmaker or Simplicity has to go. But 
since both are required by DTS, then DTS must go as well.
2. The Divine Predications Argument
There exists a kind of priority ordering between God’s intrinsic essential 
predications.27 God’s intrinsic essential predications are not simply a list 
of predications every one of which is independent from every other. They 
are rather a unified and elegant lot. There is an order amongst them such 
that the truth of some “flow” from the truth of other more basic ones. 
Brower himself accepts this when he accepts that
(1) God is wise because God is divine.28
That God is divine is more basic or fundamental than that God is wise. 
That God is divine explains that God is wise.29 Alternatively, it might 
strike many that the reversal is true
26Notice that it does not, in order to make it plausible that God explains that < God is 
omnibenevolent > is true, help to refer to God with the name “God’s omnibenevolence.” For 
notice the analogous move one could make in the case of Plato. One could decide to refer to 
Plato with the name “Plato’s human-ness” and say that it is Plato’s human-ness that makes 
< Plato is a human > true. But it does not follow from deciding to call Plato a certain name that 
Plato is now a plausible explanation for the truth of < Plato is a human >. So it does not follow 
from referring to God with the name “God’s omnibenevolence” that God is now a plausible 
explanation for the truth of < God is omnibenevolent >.
27Be careful! Predications about God are not properties of God. The former involve propo-
sitions describing God whereas the latter involve the ways God is.
28Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 117. Notice that claims like (1) cannot involve prop-
erties of God since, according to DTS, God plausibly lacks such properties. Instead, they 
involve predications about God. Another way to state (1) is as follows:
< God is wise > is true because < God is divine > is true.
For stylistic reasons, I have decided, in (1) and (2), to express dependency claims concerning 
predications about God without the use of angle brackets and the property of being true.
29Brower accepts other similar claims when he says
For as the foregoing list makes clear, the God of traditional theism possesses intel-
lectual states like knowledge (in virtue of which he is omniscient), and appetitive 
states like desires or volitions (in virtue of which he is perfectly good or loving). 
(“Simplicity and Aseity,” 106)
469AGAINST DIVINE TRUTHMAKER SIMPLICITY
(2) God is divine, at least in part, because God is wise
That God is wise is more basic or fundamental than that God is divine. 
That God is wise partly explains that God is divine.
Now what we have here between (1) and (2) are jointly exhaustive, mu-
tually exclusive, positions. Jointly exhaustive because it is just false that 
the truth of < God is wise > is not in any way explanatorily related to the 
truth of < God is divine >. Focusing on (1), notice how natural it is to think 
that God is wise (and good, and powerful, and just) because God is divine. 
As Brower says
Traditional theists standardly derive the intrinsic divine attributes (or better, 
the truth of predications involving them) from their understanding of the 
divine nature. That is to say, they take God to be not only good, powerful, 
wise, and just, but to be all these things in virtue of being divine.30
Mutually exclusive because (1) and (2) cannot both be true on pain of 
violating the irreflexivity of explanation. If God is wise because God is 
divine, and God is divine, at least in part, because God is wise, then it fol-
lows, by the transitivity of explanation (or partial explanation), that God 
is wise, at least in part, because God is wise. But this is false. That God 
is wise is not at all explained, even in part, by itself. So we must choose 
either (1) or (2) and we cannot choose both. Let us, for sake of argument, 
accept (1) (the argument to follow would work just as well if we instead 
accepted (2)).
Here is a question everyone, and so the divine simplicity theorist, has 
to answer: what explains the pattern of dependency among the truth of 
the predications expressed in (1)? That is, why is it that the truth of one 
predication, that God is wise, depends on the truth of another, that God 
is divine, rather than the other way around? In short, why (1) rather than 
(2)? This question must have an answer. That one predication is true in 
virtue of another predication is not a fundamental fact. Predications, and 
their exemplifying a dependence order, are not brute, primitive, entities or 
facts. Perhaps there is nothing that explains why certain properties obtain 
in virtue of other properties, but predications are not properties. That a 
predication is true in virtue of another predication is a semantic fact and 
semantic facts are not (at least generally) part of the fundamental story of 
the world (indeed, it is precisely this intuition which undergirds the belief 
that a proposition’s being true (which is a semantic fact) requires a truth-
maker (something in the world that metaphysically explains its truth)). So 
the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) must have an explanation on 
pain of allowing (1), which is a semantic fact, to go ungrounded.
What then could explain this pattern? Perhaps the answer is that (1) is 
a conceptual truth, and so what explains why God is wise because God 
So according to Brower, God is, at least in part, omniscient in virtue of possessing certain 
intellectual states and is, at least in part, good in virtue of possessing certain appetitive states.
30Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 117.
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is divine, and not vice-versa, has to do with the concepts WISDOM and 
DIVINITY. Consider how the concepts BACHELOR, UNMARRIED, and 
MALE explain the pattern of dependency in
(3) Bill is a bachelor because Bill is an unmarried male.
BACHELOR is made up of, or composed or constituted by, UNMARRIED 
and MALE, and it is precisely because of this that Bill is a bachelor because 
he is an unmarried male and not the other way around. It would be con-
ceptually incoherent to think that Bill is an unmarried male because he is 
a bachelor. It is a conceptual truth that anyone who satisfies BACHELOR 
does so in virtue of satisfying UNMARRIED and MALE since BACH-
ELOR decomposes into UNMARRIED and MALE. And it is a conceptual 
falsehood that anyone who satisfies UNMARRIED and MALE does so in 
virtue of satisfying BACHELOR since neither UNMARRIED nor MALE 
decomposes into bachelor. So the pattern of dependency exemplified in 
(3) is explained by appealing to the pattern of dependency exemplified 
by the concepts involved in (3). Unfortunately, this kind of explanation 
will not work in our present case. After all, (2) is a conceptually coherent 
claim. One could defend (2) against (1) without being confused about the 
concepts WISDOM and DIVINITY. It is a live debate whether we should 
accept (1) over (2), as it would not be if the disagreement over them boiled 
down to a disagreement over the concepts involved (as it plausibly does 
in the bachelor case). (1) is therefore not a conceptual truth. Brower agrees 
when, to paraphrase him, he says that it is a real question whether the list 
of divine predications (God is good, powerful, wise, just) depend on the 
predication of God’s being divine, but that it is at least coherent to say that 
they do.31 But it wouldn’t be a real question if (1) were a conceptual truth. 
If (1) were a conceptual truth, the question would be settled decisively in 
favor of (1).
Therefore, in accordance with what Brower indicates, the disagree-
ment over whether (1) or (2) is true, which is just a disagreement over 
the pattern of dependency involved, is not a disagreement over the pat-
tern of dependency exemplified between the concepts involved. Rather, 
it is a disagreement about how the world is. That is, it is not a conceptual 
disagreement, but a worldly disagreement. So what explains the pattern 
of dependency exemplified in (1) has to do with the world and not our 
concepts of the world.
In looking to the world, an initially plausible explanation of the pattern 
of dependency exemplified in (1) is the following:
(4) God’s wisdom exists because God’s divinity exists.
Here, appeal is made to God’s wisdom and divinity (as worldly entities as 
one can ask for). Moreover, what explains the pattern of dependency in (1) 
is simply that one of these worldly entities (God’s wisdom) exists in virtue 
31Ibid., 117
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of the other (God’s divinity). The thought here is that the pattern of de-
pendency that holds for predications is explained by that which holds for 
certain worldly items. There is a certain fit of direction that exists between 
the dependency of predications on predications and worldly entities on 
worldly entities. That is, if x’s F-ness exists because x’s G-ness exists, then 
this explains that x is F because x is G. Now this fit of direction strikes me 
as quite plausible. However, and unfortunately for the proponent of DTS, 
appealing to it in order to explain the pattern of dependency involved in 
(1) will not do. In order to see why, recall that DTS is committed to
Simplicity: If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then 
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
Now it follows from the intrinsic essential predications involved in (1) 
and Simplicity that God’s wisdom exists and is identical to God, and that 
God’s divinity exists and is identical to God. But this, in conjunction with 
(4), entails that God exists because God exists, which is false. Nothing (not 
even God) can explain its own existence. Explanation is irreflexive and so 
what explains God’s existence (if anything does) cannot be God’s existence. 
Moreover, we should balk at the claim that God’s existence is explained 
at all (even if what explains it is God’s existence). For if God is a se, then 
God does not exist because of anything, a fortiori, does not exist because 
of his existence.32 So, on pain of saying that God’s existence depends on it-
self, we cannot maintain that God’s wisdom exists because God’s divinity 
exist—(4) must go. So even though it is true that God is wise because God 
is divine, it cannot follow that God’s wisdom exists because God’s divinity 
exists on pain of violating the irreflexivity of explanation and on pain of 
violating God’s aseity (something the proponent of divine simplicity will 
be at pains to preserve).
Is there anything left to explain the pattern of dependency exempli-
fied in (1)? Here the DTS theorist will most likely appeal to God. God 
is what explains the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1). But this 
strains credulity. How is it that God alone can explain this pattern of de-
pendency? After all, the existence of God is clearly consistent with the 
pattern of dependency expressed in (2). But then what reason is there to 
say that God explains the pattern exemplified in (1) but not (2)? For the 
DTS theorist, what is it about God that gives us (1) and not (2)? What is it 
about God that favors accepting (1) over (2)? There must be an answer to 
this. Unfortunately, given DTS’s commitment to God’s simplicity, I do not 
see how there could be. If simple, God is just not structured in the right 
32I should note that the view of aseity at work here is the strong view (but is, I think, the 
view of aseity that proponents of divine simplicity accept). As an anonymous referee points 
out, one can understand God’s aseity as God’s existence not depending on anything (that is 
how I have understood it), or one can understand it as his existence not depending on any-
thing outside of God. If the latter, then it can be that God’s existence depends on something 
so long as it depends on something else about God (say, his essence or some essential feature 
of God).
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kind of way (because he is not structured at all) to explain the pattern of 
dependency in (1). If simple, there can be nothing about God that favors 
accepting (1) over (2). So appealing to God alone is not the answer to our 
question. Instead, appeal must be made to how God is and not simply that 
he is.
It is important not to confuse this worry with another worry that Brower 
addresses. Here is this other worry: how can an absolutely simple thing 
make true a variety of distinct predications? Brower’s response is to note 
that it is at least coherent that all, save one, of God’s non-formal, intrinsic 
essential predications depend for their truth on the predication that God 
is divine. So, as was made clear above, according to Brower, God is good, 
powerful, wise, and just because God is divine. Now since God is the 
truthmaker for < God is divine >, and since explanation is transitive and 
the truth of < God is divine > explains the truth of < God is good >, < God 
is powerful >, < God is wise >, and < God is just >, it follows that God is 
the truthmaker for all of these latter predications. So according to Brower, 
there is, in principle, no problem with God making true a variety of dis-
tinct predications. Notice though that none of this even begins to explain 
why the truth of < God is divine > explains the truth of < God is wise >. 
Rather, Brower simply assumes that it does and uses it to deflect a poten-
tial problem with DTS. But coming up with an explanation for why the 
truth of < God is divine > explains the truth of < God is wise > is precisely 
the worry that this section is concerned with. It is a worry that involves 
explaining, not how God can make true a variety of distinct predications 
about him, but how God can explain a pattern of dependency exemplified 
between distinct predications about him.
In light of all this, I am inclined to think that DTS has to take it as brute 
that the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) holds.33 This is a mark 
against it. As I stressed above, that one predication is true in virtue of 
another predication, and not the other way around, is not a fundamental, 
unexplained, fact. It is a semantic fact, and semantic facts ultimately re-
quire a ground or explanation that appeals to the non-semantic world. 
However, since I cannot see what someone who accepts DTS could accept 
as a plausible explanation for the pattern of dependency exemplified in 
(1), then I issue the following challenge: come up with an entity (or enti-
ties) that, if it exists (or if they exist), plausibly explains the pattern of 
dependency exemplified in (1).
3. Divine Truthmaker Complexity
Let us contrast DTS with another view of God which I will call Divine 
Truthmaker Complexity (“DTC” for short), where DTC is the conjunction of 
Truthmaker and
33In fact, I think the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) has to be taken as brute for 
any version of divine simplicity. 
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Complexity: If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, 
then God’s F-ness exists and is not identical with God.
The above two arguments against DTS do not tell against DTC. Consider 
what was central to the first argument, viz. that we need an adequate truth-
maker for intrinsic essential predications of God. DTC has no problem 
providing such truthmakers since such propositions are true in virtue 
of the essential intrinsic properties God instantiates. < God is F > is true 
because God’s F-ness exists, where God’s F-ness is that state of affairs or 
trope of God instantiating F-ness. So DTC, unlike DTS, is not committed 
to the claim that such propositions are true in virtue of God, which is 
explanatorily empty.
Turning to the second argument, DTC can explain the pattern of depen-
dency exemplified in
(1) God is wise because God is divine.
Recall the plausibility of saying that the pattern of dependency exem-
plified between predications is explained by the pattern of dependency 
exemplified between certain worldly items. There is a certain fit of direc-
tion that exists between the dependency that holds between predications 
and the dependency that holds between worldly entities. If x’s F-ness ex-
ists because x’s G-ness exists, then this explains that x is F because x is 
G. Now DTC can (and should) say that God’s wisdom exists, that God’s 
divinity exists, that God’s wisdom is distinct from God’s divinity, and 
that God’s wisdom exists because God’s divinity exists. But then DTC has 
all it needs to explain the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1). The 
pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) is explained by the pattern of 
dependency in states or tropes involving how God is. So DTC, unlike DTS, 
is able to provide a satisfying explanation for the pattern of dependency 
exemplified in (1). DTC, unlike DTS, imports enough structure into God 
in order to explain both the truth of intrinsic essential predications about 
God and the pattern of dependency exemplified in certain predications 
involving God.
4. Conclusion
Brower’s goal in presenting and defending DTS is to make sense of di-
vine simplicity; his goal is to show that divine simplicity is a coherent 
position.34 Moreover, Brower hopes that showing this will “help to shift 
contemporary discussion of the doctrine away from questions about its 
coherence to questions about its plausibility.”35 Now as I hope is clear, 
this paper concedes that Brower has met his goal. The objections I have 
raised against DTS do not concern its coherence but its plausibility. Divine 
simplicity is, in principle, coherent. So I think that we should shift the 
34Brower, “Making Sense,” 20.
35Ibid., 20.
474 Faith and Philosophy
contemporary discussion away from questions of coherence to questions 
of plausibility. And once we do, I think the verdict should be that divine 
simplicity, as understood by Brower, is implausible. For divine simplicity 
gets the facts about what God makes true wrong and is (at least as far as I 
can tell) unable to explain the pattern of dependency exemplified between 
certain predications about God. But no view of God should get the facts 
about what God makes true wrong. No view of God should be unable to 
explain the pattern of dependency exemplified between certain predica-
tions about God. So even if we grant, as I do, that divine simplicity is 
coherent, I do not think we should grant that it is plausible. Whatever 
merits divine simplicity has, I doubt that plausibility is one of them.36
University of Colorado at Boulder
36This paper was written in 2012/2013 while I was on fellowship at the University of Notre 
Dame’s Center for Philosophy of Religion. I would like to thank the Center both for its sup-
port during that time and for the excellent feedback I received while there. I would also 
like to thank the audience at the 2013 SCP Mountain-Pacific Region Conference where this 
paper was presented. Special thanks go to Jeffrey Brower, Travis Dumsday, and Tim Pawl for 
providing detailed comments on earlier drafts. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Amy 
Greenip, for her always present support and encouragement in my work.
